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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Were there sufficient material facts at issue such that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The matter in controversy involves a real estate listing/blank
form which was signed by a representative of defendants/appellants.

It

was, and is, the contention of appellants that, because material terms
of the form were intentionally left blank, the intent of the parties in
executing the agreement is a question of fact not properly resolved
through summary judgment.
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties and
argued on August 30, 1985.

On October 8, 1985, the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable
David B. Dee, entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs/respondents.
Because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered
by the court, it is unclear upon what basis the court found there were
no genuine issues of fact justifying summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The real property covered by the blank form which is the

subject matter of the litigation was sold on December 31, 1984.
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2.

The purchaser of the property was not a purchaser generated

as a result of any action on the part of respondents.

See, Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3.
3.

The individual representatives of the parties involved

were Ronald Christensen (hereinafter "Christensen") in behalf of respondents and Michael R. McCoy (hereinafter "McCoy") in behalf of appellants.

See, Addendum I, attached hereto and incorporated herein by

this reference.
4.

The document executed by Christensen and McCoy is a form

agreement and certain material terms of the agreement were left blank;
specifically, the date on which any agreement was to commence and a
date upon which any agreement was to expire and be of no further force
or effect.

Further, the document fails to designate a listed price for

the property.
5.

See, Addendum I.

McCoy was not authorized to enter into an exclusive listing

agreement by appellants and stated under oath that he executed the
document only to permit respondents to place a sign on the building to
advertise its availability and not as an exclusive listing agreement.
See, McCoy Deposition, p. 38, lines 1-7; p. 43, lines 8-12.
6.

Christensen interpreted the listing to be a binding agree-

ment which gave plaintiffs/respondents an exclusive listing on the property and was effective for an indefinite period of time.

See, Chris-

tensen Deposition, p. 45, lines 18-20.
7.

This action was initiated by the respondents and a hearing

was held on cross-motions for summary judgment on August 30, 1985.
8.

On October 8, 1985, the trial court entered its order deny-
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ing appellants motion for summary judgment and granting the motion of
respondents.
9.

Appellants Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 5,

1985.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be applied
cautiously.

The pleadings and documentary evidence before the court

should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.
The evidence before the trial court in this matter clearly
indicated the presence of significant disputes as to facts which are
material to resolution of this controversy; thus, the granting of
summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter and the case should
be remanded for further proceedings.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS
BECAUSE THE FACTUAL DISPUTES RAISED BY APPELLANTS
ARE SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The matter before the court is a contract dispute.

Respondents

claim that the listing form (Addendum I) constitutes a binding, enforceable agreement between the parties, despite the absence of what
appellants assert are material terms.
In opposing respondents' motion for summary judgment, appellants
raised the following issues:
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1.

Appellants

argue

that

the

form

was

signed

merely

as

an

accommodation to allow respondents to place a sign on the property;
respondents argue that the listing form was intended to be a binding,
exclusive

agreement

which

would

allow

respondents

to

market

the

property and receive a commission.
2.

Appellants

asset

that

no commission

was discussed

either

prior to or at the time the form was signed, primarily because appellants had not at that time determined whether the property was to be
sold or leased or marketed in some other manner.
3.

Appellants noted that no listing price was included in the

form because no marketing strategy had yet been determined and the
document was signed merely to allow respondents to place their sign on
the building in an effort to ascertain interest in the property.
4.

Appellants argue that, absent a definite term in and form

there is no discernible way in which it can be determined that the
property was sold during the time when the contract was in force.
Because of the conflicting testimony and evidence concerning the
intent of the parties in executing the form and in absence of such
fundamental
which

the

terms a? the

listing price and the exact terms during

listing would be enforceable, the effect of the summary

judgment granted by the trial court was to "fill in the gaps" and
create an enforceable contract where none existed.
In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment,
the task of the trial court is to examine the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions and the affidavits on file and
ascertain from the pleadings and exhibits whether a genuine issue of
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material fact exists.

If a dispute as to any material fact is evident,

summary judgment may not be granted.
This court has held that cross motions for summary judgment do
not, in and of themselves, resolve factual issues.

In Amjacs

Inter-

west, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981), the court
stated:
"As
an
initial
consideration, we
note
that
the
filing of cross-motions
for
summary
judgment does
not mean that this case may be finally disposed
of as a matter of law.
Cross-motions for summary
judgment
do
not
ipso
facto
dissipate
factual
issues, even though both parties contend
for the
purposes of their motions that they are entitled
to prevail because
there
are no material
issues
of fact."
635 P.2d at 55
It is well established that summary judgment should only be invoked in cases where it clearly appears, from the record before the
court that the moving party has established his right to judgment, beyond a doubt.

See, Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, supra;

Tangren v. Ingalls, 367 P.2d 179 (Utah 1961); Jensen v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); Livingston

Indus-

tries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1977).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider factual inferences as tending to show triable issues of material
fact in the light most favorable to the existence of such issues. See,
Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah 1963); Northern Contracting Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 573 P.2d 65 (Ariz. 1977).

The district court

failed to do so in this case.
To successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment, the oppos-
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ing party must only bring to light

specific

facts which present a

genuine issue for trial which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party, would entitle him to prevail.

Indeed, summary judgment is only

appropriate in those situations where there is no set of facts which,
if proved, would allow the nonmoving party to succeed.
v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613

(Utah 1982).

See, Jackson

Here appellants clearly demon-

strated
that in order to prevail, the respondents must show the property was
sold within the term of a listing; since no one knew the term, the
court could see or should have been able to see that an issue of fact
exists.
In the case of Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d

191

(Utah

1975), this court noted that:
" . . . [I]t only takes one sworn statements under oath to
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of facts. This is analogous to the
elemental rule that the fact trier may believe one witness
as against many, or many against one."
542 P.2d 191, 193
The court went further in Holbrook, supra, holding that if there
is any dispute as to an issue material to resolution of the controversy, summary judgment should not be granted.

542 P.2d

191, 193.

It is undisputed that the signed deposition of McCoy qualified as a
sworn statement in dispute of the facts claimed by the plaintiffs.
As more fully discussed below, defendants/appellants in this action
raised

sufficient

disputes

as

to material

facts

to

preclude

the

granting of summary judgment.
As noted by the court

in Northern Contracting

Co. v. Allis-

Chalmers Corp., 573 P.2d 65 (Ariz. 1977), in considering a motion for
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summary judgment, neither the trial court, nor the appellate court may
weigh the evidence presented and if conflicting inferences can be drawn
from the circumstances, summary disposition is unwarranted.

Id. at 67.

See, also, Tanqren v. Inqalls, 367 P.2d 179, 185 (Utah 1961); Holbrook
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193.
Specifically dealing with cases in which the written contract
was alleged to have been ambiguous, this court has consistently held
that where the contract itself contained uncertain or missing terms,
evidence on the intent of the parties was both permissible and appropriate in resolving the controversy.

See, Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665

P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Hellstrom v. Osquthorpe, 455 P.2d 28, 29
(Utah 1969); Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898, 899 (Utah 1963).
The situation confronting the trial court in this case involved
a written form in which certain materials terms, i.e. the listing price
and the term of the agreement, were omitted.

The averments of the par-

ties as to why those terms were omitted differs significantly.
Of particular significance in the instant case is the omission
of an effective term during which the purported agreement would be in
force.

Appellants urged in their opposition to respondents1 motion for

summary judgment that without this material term, it is impossible to
determine whether or not a commission is due in that it is impossible
to determine whether the sale took place during a period of time when
the agreement was in effect.

If the effective term of the agreement

had terminated prior to consummation of a sale, no commission would be
due to respondents.

Without findings and conclusions, we can only as-

sume that the court below did not consider this pivotal issue to be
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material to resolution of the controversy.
The trial court, in error, disregarded all conflicting averments
and entered summary judgment.

Appellants are entitled to further pro-

ceedings at which the evidence relating to the dispute may be weighed
by a trier of fact and an equitable determination made.
CONCLUSION
The trial court had before it information sufficient to evidence
genuine issues as to material facts in this controversy.

Those issues

are more than adequate to preclude the granting of summary judgment in
respondents1 favor.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed

and the matter remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of February, 1986.

GEItALD H.(jCiN6l!6RN
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS
Attorneys for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, postage prepaid, this 21st day of February, 1986, to the following:
David R. Olson, Esq.
Michael Allen, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondents
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-148
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ADDENDUM I

An enlargement of t h i s form i s
included on the following page

SALES AGENCY CONTRACT
(Form A)

t

jj

Memoer of Muitioie Listing Servica of Sait Lake Board of REALTORS*
In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form 3 ano to use reasonable
e^'orts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor, I heresy grant you for the period stztec herein, from dare
ne^eof. the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part Thereof, at the price and
terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to wmcn I may agree m writing.
Ourmg the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready, able and willing to buy, lease or
excnange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or terms, to
wmcn I may agree in writing, or if said property or any part thereof is soid. eased or exchanged
durmg^said term by myself or any other parry, I agree to pay the broker listed beiow a commission
of
:
% of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless otherwise agreed m
writing shall be due and payaoie on the date of closing the sale, lease or sxcnange. Should said
prooerty be sold, leased or exchanged within
1^
months after such expiration to any party to
whom the property was offered or shown by me, or you. or any other parry curing the term of this
listing, I agree to pay you the commission aoove stated if I am not ooligated to pay a commission on
such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency contract entered
into after the expiration date of this contract.
You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on the
property as described on the property description and informational form (form 3). Said deposit to oe
held m a trust account.
I nereoy warrant the information contained on the prooerty description and informational form
(form 8) to be correct and that I have marketaoie title or an otherwise estaoiisneo ngnt to sell, lease or
excnange said prooerty. exceof as stated. I agree to execute the necessary documents of conveyance
or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting said
prooerty to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marxetaoie title with abstract to date
or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purcnase price and in the name of the
purchaser. In the event of sale or lease of other than real prooerty, I agree to provice proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to seil. lease or exchange.
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement, 1 agree to
ay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection.
You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party
holding a lien or interest on this property.
You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS*.
You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property.
This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed, modified or altered exceot by prior written
instrument executed by the Principal 3roker and the owner(s) shown below, excsot that the listed
price shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s).
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons pasec on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin in connection with the sale, iease or exchange ot properties under
thi? acreement.

USTED PPnPFs-rv

35 MEST SR^ntlAY
SALT LAKE CITY. l^AH

LISTED PRICE
S
This contract is entered into this
This contract expires on the

day of
day of

Lilting Company

. 19„. 19-

_

-

Qvtnor 'Signature)

Principal 8ro*e* (lr»s»<T Nam«»

.%

BY

Own«r.<S>gn»tu/«H

/'/

Autnonztti Ag&nt (Signature!

I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the property
description and information form (Form B).
*

moiete oom Form A and Form a.
^ o y JO owner — i cooy fo uatmq orfic*

-'
S L 3 ft fl«vu»<J 2/1/84

